The JASON-1 small satellite was launched in December 2001 and has performed successfully since one year, with in-flight performances exceeding expectations. The JASON-1 mission is dedicated to ocean and climate forecasting, in continuation to the successful TOPEX-POSEIDON satellite, launched in 1992. This project is a cooperation between NASA and CNES. JASON-1 is the first satellite based on the small PROTEUS bus, a cooperative partnership between CNES and ALCATEL Space Industries. This project was initiated in 1993 and entered in 1996 in its development phase. At that time, the "Faster, Better, Cheaper" guidelines were driving the decisions and thus strong budgetary and schedule constraints were placed on the project while keeping ambitious technical performances. After more than one year of Jason operations in orbit, this paper gives a synthetic view of the major project achievement with respect to the initial requirements with a focus on advantages and drawbacks of a fast-paced development and qualification.
INTRODUCTION
The development of the Jason system was a real challenge for many reasons:
• The development of a complete system with a new satellite bus as well as new end users product definition and new control and mission ground segment.
• The first launch of a CNES Satellite on a Delta II launcher from the Vandenberg launch site, in a dual launch configuration.
• The establishment of new relation ship between CNES and the Space Industry through partnership instead of standard contractual relations.
• The first CNES implementation of a "Faster, Better, Cheaper" approach.
• The first CNES satellite with routine operations delegated to an other entity (JPL/ NASA). The excellent behavior of the entire system since launch clearly shows that these challenges have been met with success. One of the major achievements was to reduce the cost of the mission from about one half, with respect to the previous TOPEX mission, while keeping the same in flight-performances, in less than 5 years of development cycle.
THE JASON-1 MISSION AND SATELLITE
The main scientific objectives of the new Jason-1 mission were defined after examining feedback from the TOPEX/POSEIDON mission. The first discipline to benefit from these measurements is physical oceanography. This includes ocean circulation, multi-season to multi-year variability, changes in mean sea level, tides and sea state conditions.
The Jason-1 three axis stabilized satellite is approximately 3.4 m high and has a total mass of 490 Kg (275 Kg for the platform and 175 Kg for the payload module including science instruments). Jason-1 is about five times lighter than TOPEX. Once in orbit, the two sets of solar panel of 9.5 m2 generates about 500 Watts. Jason-1 is designed to last for an operational mission of 3 years and an extended mission of 2 years, all life limited elements being sized for at least 5 years.
The satellite is carrying a payload of 5 instruments. A two-frequency altimeter called Poseidon-2 and a DORIS orbitography system are provided by CNES. NASA has provided a three frequency radiometer, a GPS precise location system and a laser reflector.
Jason-1 has been launched together with TIMED from the Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) on a DELTA II launch vehicle (7920-10) built by Boeing and provided by NASA, in a Dual Payload configuration with a new Payload Attach Fitting that allows to carry two satellites at the same time..
JASON-1 DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT : REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS
Jason-1 was the first satellite based on the PROTEUS bus. It was a real challenge both on a programmatic and technical standpoint to develop and validate a platform product line and a first satellite in parallel.
From the programmatic standpoint, it was the first partnership which CNES established with a satellite industrial contractor with equal financial participation. When, in mid-1994, following NASA satellite funding shortcut, CNES indicated that the PROTEUS initiative could be the adequate solution to substantially reduce both spacecraft and mission costs, the PROTEUS program had just started Phase A.
By the time the development started, the "Faster, Better, Cheaper " paradigm was very common. This generally translated into several "guidelines" like : • Use as much as possible electronic parts of "commercial" standard as opposed to usual "space" or "military" standard.
• Strongly "success oriented" schedule with important development and validation phase overlapping and parallel activities.
• Strong reliance on benches to validate the system and its operational behavior.
• Reduction of the number of system and element reviews as well as simplification and alleviation of their progress and minimization of the documentation.
• Maximum use of COT's (Commercial Off The shelf) equipment.
• Decrease of the number of redundancies.
PROJECT ACHIEVEMENTS

Use as much as possible electronic parts of "commercial" or "military" standard
as opposed to usual "space" standard:
Finally, only a few number of commercial components are actually flying on Jason-1:
On the payload instrument side, all the instruments on board Jason-1 had a very strong heritage from TOPEX and it was always argued by the industrial contractor that moving to commercial part would strongly affect this heritage and thus strongly increase overall cost even if the EEE components cost was reduced.
On the satellite bus, using "off the shelf" equipment was strongly encouraged but these equipment were existing with space or military standard EEE components. Finally, our experience with commercial parts was very limited, especially in a harsh radiation environment such as the Jason orbit.
In addition, specific procurement rules were to be developed for those new components. At the same time, requirements of life time, reliability and availability objectives were not relaxed, and this resulted in a very "classical" approach leading to the use of "known" space or military EEE components.
Strongly "success oriented" schedule with important development phase overlapping and parallel activities:
To summarize, with respect to the initial planned launch date (March 1999), the total schedule slip was about 19 months, of which 6 are directly due to a structural SADM (Solar Array Drive Mechanism) failure that was discovered very lately in the satellite qualification program, and other 13 month mostly related to test benches development and validation delays which impacted the overall system and operational qualification.
Equipment and instrument delivery and Spacecraft Assembly, Integration and Test process were already close to the critical path. This ambitious schedule was imposed "a priori" without having checked that the relevant resources were available and if the associated "function-sliced" architecture was adequate.
This schedule was an "incentive tool" which proved to be efficient at first but this efficiency strongly decreased when it turned out that the schedule was no longer realistic. The schedule pressure can lead to contradictory objectives. The good compromise is to maintain some "pressure" while keeping reasonable objectives.
In the end, 5 years to design, develop, and validate a complete space system from flight hardware to end users interface, while qualifying a fully new satellite bus, with highly ambitious performances objectives and without accepting strong mission risk increase, remains a remarkable achievement both by the space agencies and the industrial community.
Strong reliance on benches to validate the system and its operational behavior:
A significant part of the validation would have to rely on the satellite simulator bench while running in parallel the Satellite Integration and Test activities. But an underestimate of the workload to develop the benches, associated with some technical problems related to their complexity, made the development and validation of the benches much more longer and difficult than expected. These benches, used for satellite functional validation and for overall system operational qualification, proved to be very efficient with a very good representativity of the real hardware. Thanks to these benches, the test coverage of the Jason system by the time of the launch was very good. For future application, the same strategy will be applied and a numerical simulator, easier to develop and duplicate will be used in addition, for the preparation of Satellite operations
Reduction of the number of system and element reviews as well as simplification and alleviation of their progress
Phase A and PDR system reviews were "lightened" thanks to a strong inheritage from TOPEX. For all major Jason satellite or system reviews, the process of the reviews was adapted to fit within 3 working days.
An other factor that influenced strongly the review process was the decision taken by NASA to systematically implement a Red Team review process before authorizing a mission launch. This process was also applied on Jason, from the satellite qualification review until launch. It was decided to have the NASA Red Team review board participating to the major project reviews in parallel to the CNES Standing Review Board.
This process proved to be very efficient with both review groups working closely, each one issuing its own report after coherency checking. In the end, the overall Jason system review process proved to be as efficient as for any other complex project.
Maximum use of COTS (Commercial Off the Shell) equipment
Most of the PROTEUS platform equipment were not exactly COTS but derived from existing equipment already used in space application. Their procurement rules, both in terms of contractual rules and technical aspects, have been customized according to their "recurrence" level. Four categories have been defined : A) Equipment specifically developed for PROTEUS, B) Equipment already developed and qualified for other programs but with modifications needed for PROTEUS, C) Equipment already qualified, no modifications required, but a delta qualification (e.g mechanical environment) had to be performed D) Equipment already qualified with specifications fully compliant with PROTEUS. This strategy allowed the prime contractor to customize contractual and technical follow-up to each category of equipment and it proved to be a good practice with one exception, the SADM. This piece of equipment was not considered critical but the combination of organization problems among sub-contractors, heavy budgetary constraints, very limited risk assessment and also some "bad luck" circumstances, lead to a very critical situation with the late discovery of a structural failure. For the star tracker, the platform GPS and also the solar generator, the development was not really straightforward but in each case, ALCATEL and CNES quickly set in place the required resources to closely monitor and drive the corrective actions
Decrease of the number of redundancies:
• This option was quickly discarded in view of the very strong impact on the overall reliability. In addition, it was always anticipated to have redundant payload instruments which in case of single string bus makes the satellite reliability figure totally unbalanced between payload and bus. Moreover, it was possible to implement redundancy while staying in the overall total mass cap of 500 Kg with a somewhat marginal impact on the overall cost due to the product line cost decrease effect.
Other lessons learned :
The AI&T sequence of activities was sometimes impacted by anomalies which in the end did not impact the schedule due to the other critical path (benches). Among the lessons learned, we found out that:
• The Ground Support Equipment used in this sequence shall be carefully validated before starting satellite integration.
• One should not postpone at a later stage a test that can be performed earlier in the sequence. This is often done due to schedule pressure but proved to be a source of problems occurring later and much more difficult to be identified and fixed.
• Some flexibility is required when testing a new scientific payload. This dictates frequent modifications of test procedures which is often in conflict with an industrial streamlined AI&T sequence. Here again, a compromise has to be found and the rules shall be agreed in advance by all partners.
• Test at the launch site shall be minimized. If satellite performance check has been correctly done before shipment, only limited "aliveness" tests are needed. More over, the different environments between the satellite integration site and the launch site may lead to unexpected differences in the results that are then very difficult to track and explain
